modem view that any point is uniquely determined by its position relative to the rational points. But the secret of continuity remains out of reach, as long as we reject the completed totality of points.
In 1858, Dedekind felt "overpowering dissatisfaction" with this situation, and resolved to "secure a real definition of the essence of continuity." He tells us that he succeeded on November 24, 1858, and in doing so he made the first real advance in our understanding of the continuum since Eudoxus.
For the modem mathematician, Dedekind's construction of the real number continuum R is profoundly simple: take the set Q of rationals, and define the irrationals to be the gaps in Q (or "cuts" as they are often called). That is, an irrational is a partition of Q into two sets, QL and Qu, such that * each member of QL is less than all members of Qu, * QL has no greatest member, Qu has no least member.
Thus each individual irrational is determined by its position in the rationals, as for Eudoxus, but now we consider the totality R of rationals and irrationals, and we see that it has no gaps, by construction.
This definition of the continuum could not be more convincing, but it makes an irrevocable commitment to completed infinite sets: each point is determined by a set of rationals (say, the set QL), and R itself is a set of such sets. Perhaps we can avoid viewing QL as a completed infinity, since it may be a set we can step through discretely like 1, 2, 3, .. ., but there is no way to do this for R. This is where the modern struggle with the cont-inuum begins, with Cantor in the 1 870s.
3. COUNTABLE AND UNCOUNTABLE. The countable infinite sets are those that can be ordered (or "listed") in such a way that each element has only finitely many predecessors. The prototype example is the set N of natural numbers, whose natural ordering is such a list: 0, 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 10, 11, 12, 139 ....
Since any member of the set is reached in a finite number of steps (each step being addition of 1), there is no need to imagine infinitely many steps actually being completed. One is free to regard a countable set as potentially, but not actually, infinite. This is the only type of infinity considered to exist by the ancient Greeks, and also by other eminent mathematicians such as Gauss. With a little ingenuity, many other useful infinite sets can be "counted," and hence made acceptable by these strict standards of mathematical existence. They (the rule here being to list fractions for which numerator and denominator have sum 2 first, then those for which the sum is 3, then those for which the sum is 4, etc.), and all the rationals These examples show that the concept of a countably infinite set is of wide scope, perhaps wide enough to raise the hope that any infinity is countable and hence merely "potentially" infinite. Cantor himself appears to have believed that he could prove R to be countable, and was taken aback when he discovered otherwise in late 1873. His first reaction was to draw the positive conclusion that here was a new proof that not all numbers are algebraic, and this was how he first presented uncountability to the world, in 1874.
Of course, it was not long before the uncountability of R was recognized as fundamental, and its importance was reflected in at least three different proofs.
Any countable set has gaps (Cantor 1874).
Given a list of real numbers xo, xl, X2, x3,.. ., Cantor sifts through them to find a "gap": members of the list ao < a, < a2 < ... < b2 < b, < bo with no xi between the aj and bk. Thus he generalizes the known gaps in known countable sets (such as VX in the rationals).
* Any countable set has measure zero (Harnack 1885).
Given a list of real numbers x0, x1, X2, x3, .. ., Harnack covers xi by an interval of length s/2i+1, thus covering the whole set {xO, X1, x2, x3, ... . by a set of total length less than s. Since the line R has infinite length, the numbers x0, X1, x2, x3, ... make up "almost none" of DR. * Any countable set can be diagonalized (Cantor 1891).
Given (say) decimal expansions of real numbers x0, xl, X2, X3, . .., Cantor constructs a number x different from each xi by making x unequal to xi at the i th decimal place (taking care to avoid an x with two different decimal expansions).
The first proof of uncountability looks back to Dedekind's definition of the irrationals as the gaps in the rationals. It reveals a pleasant harmony between modem and ancient senses of the word "complete": if ER is complete in the sense of having no gaps, then we must accept it as a completed infinity, because it is not countable. The second and third proofs look forward to two of the most important themes in set theory: measurability and the diagonal argument, both of which generalize to larger sets.
In particular, the diagonal argument immediately generalizes to show that any set X is smaller than its power set P(X) (the set of all subsets of X). Instead of decimal expansions, one considers characteristic functions of subsets of X and, if there is a subset Sx of X paired with each x in X, diagonalization gives the set S = {x : x , Sx} , different from each subset Sx at the element x. Thus X has more subsets S than elements x. However, the general diagonal argument shows that IR has more subsets than elements, so none of the sets just mentioned is as large as the set P(IR) of all subsets of ER, or the set of all real functions, both of which have cardinality 22 ?. Nevertheless, the ubiquity of the cardinality 2'0 among uncountable sets of reals led Cantor to conjecture in 1878 that it was the cardinality of any uncountable subset of ER. This was the first version of the continuum hypothesis.
Weak continuum hypothesis (Cantor 1878). Any uncountable set of real numbers
has cardinality 2'0. 6. THE AXIOM OF CHOICE. The strong continuum hypothesis is more appealing than the weak continuum hypothesis, but also less plausible, because it implies that R can be well-ordered. Given a one-to-one correspondence between the reals and the countable ordinals, the reals are well-ordered by (the order of) their corresponding ordinals. Cantor in fact believed that any set can be well-ordered, but no such ordering is known for R. Well-ordering of a set S implies, among other things, that there is a choice function for subsets of S, that is, a function f such that f (X) belongs to X for each nonempty subset X of S. Namely, we can take f (X) to be the least member of X, according to the well-ordering of S. Conversely, a choice function for the subsets of S can be used to well-order S.
This well-ordering theorem was first proved by Zermelo in 1904, and was controversial, but today it is seen as an "obvious" transfinite induction. Just as ordinary induction is based on the fact that any natural number can be reached from 0 by the successor operation, transfinite induction is based on the fact that any ordinal can be reached by the successor and least upper bound operations. This process assigns ordinal subscripts to members of S "indefinitely" in the following sense: as long as the subset of S that has been assigned ordinals, {s,, : a < ,8}, is not all of S, we can assign an ordinal to at least one more member of S. It follows that all members of S are assigned ordinals, and S is thereby well-ordered.
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Zermelo's assumption of a choice function is called the axiom of choice (AC), because it has no proof from other axioms of set theory. Most mathematicians accept Zermelo's axiom, because of the greater regularity it affords in many parts of mathematics. In particular, it is generally assumed that R can be well-ordered, and hence its cardinality is one of the alephs N, I , 3, ... obtained by iterating the above construction of ti. However, the axiom of choice (and hence also the strong continuum hypothesis) has consequences that make IR look irregular in some respects. In particular, it implies that some subsets of IR are not measurable. 
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Luzin's group in Moscow that studied the works of the French school and extended their ideas far beyond the Borel sets.
In his 1905 paper, Lebesgue casually claimed another closure property of the Borel sets: namely, that the orthogonal projection of a Borel set is also Borel. In 1916, Luzin's student Suslin found a counterexample to this claim, and thus showed that the projection operation leads to a larger class of sets. The sets generated from the Borel sets by projection (and complementation, since the projection of a projection is obviously a projection) are now called the projective sets, and they form a hierarchy of length co. Level 1 consists of the projections of Borel sets (called analytic sets) and their complements, while level n + 1 consists of projections of sets at level n, and the complements of these projections.
In 1917, Luzin proved that analytic sets are measurable, and that they satisfy the weak continuum hypothesis. However, he was not able to extend this result farther into the projective hierarchy, and by 1925 he was ready to make a remarkable prophecy:
One does not know, and one will never know, whether the projection of the complement of an analytic set (supposed uncountable) has the cardinality of the continuum, ... nor whether it is measurable.
( If the list xO, xl, x2, ... is computable, in the sense that the ith digit of xj is a computable function of i and j, then x is also computable, in the sense that its nth digit is a computable function of n. It follows that there is no computable list of all computable real numbers. This result has implications for axiom systems, because an axiom system is supposed to produce a computable list of theorems. It means that no consistent axiom system can produce a complete list of theorems of the form "program n defines a computable real number," for the output of such an axiom system could be diagonalized to produce a (program for) a new computable real. (An inconsistent system can produce all these theorems, but only because it proves everything!) The argument just given is not the same as G6del's-it is somewhat informal and in fact closer to an argument discovered by Post in 1921 but not published until twenty years later-but it contains the same essential idea. Godel could not speak about computable real numbers because in 1931 computability did not have a mathematical definition. However, it does now (since Turing in 1936), and we can assume that any axiom system for set theory is capable of expressing it. We therefore have:
Giidel's first incompleteness theorem. For any consistent axiom system E for set theory, there is a true sentence -c about real numbers not proved by E.
The second theorem is more subtle, but it follows from the first by examining the role of the assumption that E is consistent. This assumption can itself be expressed in the language of E, as a sentence Con(E). But Con(E) cannot be proved, as it turns out that this would yield the unprovable Godel sentence -r. Thus we have:
The method by which G6del proved these results was by modelling the ZF axioms by what he called the constructible sets. These are roughly the sets that have "names" when the language of ZF is enlarged by names for the ordinals. It follows easily that the universe of constructible sets satisfies the axioms of ZF, and that it is well-ordered, since the collection of "names" inherits a well-ordering (rather like alphabetical ordering) from the ordering of the ordinals. A more subtle proof shows that all constructible reals have names involving only countable ordinals, and hence that there are only N, of them, so the continuum hypothesis is true in the constructible sets. Finally, the wellordering of constructible reals turns out to be a level 2 projective set, and this gives nonmeasurable sets at the same level.
G6del believed that the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis are in fact neither provable nor disprovable from the ZF axioms, but he was unable to show this much. His suspicions were finally confirmed by Cohen Another important consequence of measurable cardinals was proved by Scott in 1960: if there is a measurable cardinal, then not every set is constructible. This puts measurable cardinals in conflict with the concept of constructibility used by Godel to prove the consistency of the continuum hypothesis; however, measurable cardinals do not contradict the continuum hypothesis itself. Many models are now known to satisfy the continuum hypothesis, and it appears that no large cardinal axiom alone will contradict it.
Nevertheless, there is another way in which large cardinal axioms can illuminate the continuum hypothesis, and this is the subject of our last section. None of these results settle the continuum hypothesis, but they change the face of set theory by suggesting new axioms, such as projective determinacy. Woodin has now written a 900-page book (and he has more books on the way!) explaining how these new axioms may be expected to fill the glaring gaps in the theory of real numbers, so that only G6del sentences and consistency statements remain unprovable. In particular, the new axioms imply that 2'0= -2, hence that the continuum hypothesis is false. Modern set theory is a highly intricate subject, and no doubt it will be a long time before working mathematicians are prepared to accept new axioms, especially when the axioms cannot even be properly described in an article of this size. However, it seems to me that all mathematicians should be curious about these developments, and I urge readers to take the next step, which is to read Woodin's own introduction to his program in [7] .
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